Almraet--The working hypothesis of the paper is that motor images are endowed with the same properties as those of the (corresponding) motor representations, and therefore have the same functional relationship to the imagined or represented movement and the same causal role in the generation of this movement. The fact that the timing of simulated movements follows the same constraints as that of actually executed movements is consistent with this hypothesis. Accordingly, many neural mechanisms are activated during motor imagery, as revealed by a sharp increase in tendinous reflexes in the limb imagined to move, and by vegetative changes which correlate with the level of mental effort. At the cortical level, a specific pattern of activation, that closely resembles that of action execution, is observed in areas devoted to motor control. This activation might be the substrate for the effects of mental training. A hierarchical model of the organization of action is proposed: this model implies a short-term memory storage of a 'copy' of the various representational steps. These memories are erased when an action corresponding to the represented goal takes place. By contrast, if the action is incompletely or not executed, the whole system remains activated, and the content of the representation is rehearsed. This mechanism would be the substrate for conscious access to this content during motor imagery and mental training.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to investigate the concept of mental imagery in the context of motor actions. The general idea is that motor imagery is part of a broader phenomenon (the motor representation) related to intending and preparing movements. The process of motor representation, a normally non-conscious process, can be accessed consciously under certain conditions: a motor image is a conscious motor representation. According to this definition, motor images are endowed with the same properties as those of the (corresponding) motor representation, that is, they have the same functional relationship to the imagined or represented movement and the same causal role in the generation of this movement. This idea has been fully developed elsewhere [39] . The aim of the present paper is to examine its implications for a model of action generation.
A possible way of differentiating motor images from other, better known, types of imagery (e.g. visual) is to determine the subjective 'distance' between the self and his own imaginal experience. Mental images can be experienced by the self as a spectator watching a visual scene in which an action is performed by the representing subject himself (the socalled 'external' imagery of sport psychologists, see [45] ). Images can also be experienced from within, as the result of the 'first person' process involving mostly a kinesthetic representation of the action ('internal' imagery [45] ). Motor imagery would thus belong to the latter type. It would imply that the subject feels himself executing a given action,
